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The Fracturing of Pakistan
Benazir Bhutto’s tragic death in late De-
cember, 2007 reopened long festering 
fissures in Pakistani society. Over the 
last several years, Pakistan has been 
represented as a place where increas-
ingly belligerent Islamist radicals are 
pitched against an entrenched military 
ruler who seeks to make the country 
into a moderate Muslim state. Yet the ri-
oting and looting in places like Karachi, 
the commercial heart of the country, 
and the adjoining Sindh province demonstrate other deep fractures in 
Pakistani social life. The city and the province were littered with burnt-
out cars, trucks, and trailers. Private universities, schools, factories, go-
vernment buildings, banks, petrol pumps, and “posh” food outlets, were 
all attacked.
The targets were clearly symbols of institutions “where the poor can-
not afford to study; businesses where they cannot get jobs; government 
offices where they have to pay bribes and where they are insulted and 
abused.”1 The extent of damage to private and public property clearly 
shows that, in addition to an outpouring of anger and grief, this reac-
tion was also indicative of frustration at rising poverty levels. This is not 
surprising; the percentage of Pakistan’s population falling at or below 
the poverty line increased from 17% in 1991 to close to 38% in 2002.2 
Since then, unemployment levels have also increased and there is an 
increasingly widespread sense of deprivation that has set in among the 
populace after eight years of military rule.
In recent years, public and political questioning of its military rule 
has raised important questions about the Pakistani state’s legitimacy. 
One key point is the state’s identification with certain ethnic groups, 
most notably the Punjabis. Sixty years after independence, and more 
than thirty years after the creation of Bangladesh, the state has not suc-
cessfully integrated its many cultures and diverse linguistic groups. The 
spate of suicide bombings in the last two years, the (alleged) influence 
of the Taliban and other radical groups in areas bordering Afghani-
stan, and the ongoing insurgency in Baluchistan continue to remind 
us of other cracks in Pakistan’s social fabric. Under General Musharaf, 
the military attempted to portray itself as a stable political institution 
protecting Pakistan from radical Islamists and inept civilian representa-
tives. Yet, although the General always spoke of providing “security” to 
the country, his tenure was marked by numerous “army operations,” as 
these were euphemistically termed, in Baluchistan and Sarhad (North 
West Frontier Province).
While there may be little doubt about the ideological orientation of 
the Islamist radicals in the region, there are also elements of Pashtun 
(the dominant ethnic group in Sarhad) nationalism and self-assertion 
intermingled with the religious idiom. How Pakistan’s North West Fron-
tier Province, the area bordering Afghanistan with a majority Pashtun 
population, went from being a hub of nationalist and leftist politics to 
being identified with radical Islamic movements remains an unwritten 
part of Pakistani history. When it is written, the narrative of this trans-
formation must, of course, include a major section on the roles played 
by Pakistan’s security services and state structures in addition to those 
of the US and other international players during and after the war in 
Afghanistan in the 1980s.
In addition, the state has also pushed against Baluch and Sindhi po-
litical aspirations targeting ethnic nationalists and various groups who 
resist the building of army cantonments and high tech ports on their 
lands, or have stood against the export of natural resources without 
compensation to local communities. During such engagements, the 
military strategies have included aerial carpet bombing, the use of 
heavy artillery or incursions with tanks; needless to say, such tactics do 
not distinguish between terrorists and innocent civilians. The inappro-
priateness of such manoeuvres has never been lost on the local peo-
ple who have increasingly resented and resisted the army’s presence in 
their midst. This was quite evident in the public support for the recently 
dismissed Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudry.
The judiciary 
The Chief Justice, previously hand-
picked by the General, was summar-
ily dismissed by General Musharaf in 
March 2007 for agreeing to accept 
habeas corpus petitions from families 
of disappeared persons who many sus-
pect have been handed over to foreign 
intelligence agencies as part of Gen-
eral Musharaf’s “services” in the “War 
on Terror.” As the Chief Justice publicly 
resisted his dismissal, the public support he received went, perhaps, 
beyond his own expectations. In one case, due to the crowds gathered 
alongside the road, his convoy took 28 hours to travel from Islamabad 
to Lahore for a journey that normally lasts four to five hours. The law-
yers’ movement built around the Chief Justice was clearly a resistance 
to the wider implications of General Musharaf’s regime.
Chaudry’s case seemingly united many factions within Pakistani so-
ciety. However, over time the movement became increasingly the do-
main of middle class activists. Whereas protest had previously tended 
to focus on unemployment and poverty, after Chaudry’s dismissal, the 
perimeters of effective protest have shifted to include visible markers 
of democracy, such as the freedom of the judiciary and the media. It is 
clear that the two sets of concerns are not mutually exclusive. Yet for 
many perhaps it was the Chief Justice’s defiance to the military rule that 
provided inspiration, and not a general call for upholding the rights of 
the judiciary. Indeed, the judiciary in Pakistan, in its abstract form, has 
historically—linked as court cases are to high lawyer fees, bribery to 
various officers of the courts, and intimidation by more powerful par-
ties—seldom provided free and fair justice to the common person. 
Through his government’s handling of the Chaudry matter, General 
Musharaf faced severe pressure regarding the legitimacy of his rule. 
The most sophisticated political group in Pakistan, the military, eventu-
ally managed the crisis and temporarily pacified matters by reinstating 
the Chief Justice in July 2007. At the same time, under intense pressure 
from the US to demonstrate its anti-Islamist credentials (and perhaps 
also to divert attention from rising anti-Musharaf sentiment), the state 
also used excessive force against the radicals in the Red Mosque (Lal 
Masjid) in Islamabad. As students and teachers barricaded themselves 
in the Lal Masjid complex, the army laid siege and eventually raided the 
compound. In the process, scores of men, women, and children were 
killed or wounded.
The political parties 
During this period, there can be little doubt that mainstream po-
litical parties did not provide effective support for the lawyers’ move-
ment. Indeed, at the peak of the movement’s popularity, Benazir 
Bhutto entered into a deal with Musharaf that allowed her to return 
to Pakistan without the threat of pending corruption cases against 
her. Musharaf delivered on this promise by passing the infamous NRO 
(National Reconciliation Ordinance), effectively wiping out all corrup-
tion charges against politicians made prior to 1999. With its mass base, 
Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party could have bridged the gap 
between the lawyers’ movement and the larger public. Yet, by enter-
ing into this deal, Bhutto effectively betrayed the lawyer’s movement 
by leaving no viable political route for its demands of judicial freedom 
and civil liberties to be met. With one of the key opposition parties 
now thus hamstrung, the lawyer’s movement could hope to make no 
further significant changes at the political level. 
When in October Bhutto finally returned to Pakistan after eight years 
in exile, her welcome procession in Karachi was rocked by a bomb ex-
plosion that killed close to 150 people and injured many others. Soon 
after this, the government escalated its military operations in the 
Swat valley, a part of the Sarhad Province that was hitherto peace-
ful. In this case, the government’s operations were directed towards a 
group of supporters of proselytizing leader Maulvi Fazlulallah (previ-
ously in league with the state’s own security agencies). However, yet 
Pakistan’s democratic and civilian groups 
face various problems: Issues of national 
integrity, reduction of violence, the creation 
of a governing consensus among different 
provinces and ethnic groups; all of these will 
have to be tackled by the new parliament. 
But just as important as the restoration of 
democracy and the end of military involvement 
in politics are problems of poverty and 
economic deprivation.
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again these operations involved the aerial bombing of villages and 
road blockades—an approach which led to food and medical short-
ages. There is ongoing speculation that the incidences at Lal Masjid 
and in Swat valley were conveniently timed by the regime. For, not 
only were they useful in diverting public attention from various press-
ing economic and social crises, such instances also allowed Musharaf 
to present himself as the voice of secularism and religious freedom to 
a Western audience.3
Military rule
Fearing a high court ruling that his presidency was now unconsti-
tutional, on 3 November 2007 Musharaf imposed emergency rule. To 
tackle what he perceived as the worsening security situation, Mus-
haraf dismissed the superior judiciary and held the constitution in 
abeyance. The state enforced new regulatory rules on the media and 
imprisoned thousands of people. Hand picked Supreme Court judges 
ruled in favor of the General and he was elected president for the next 
five years by the Election Commission of Pakistan.
Continued local and international disenchantment led Musharaf to 
renounce his army role and become a “civilian” president.4 Moreover, 
a date for elections in January (postponed to 18 February following 
Bhutto’s death) was announced. Riding on the platform of a burgeon-
ing pro-democracy movement of lawyers, students, and civil society 
actors, a coalition of political parties, including the Islamist party 
Jama‘at-e-Islami, announced that they would boycott the elections 
unless the judiciary was restored and emergency rule lifted by 28 No-
vember 2007. Participation in the polls by political parties was seen 
as an acceptance of the political process as laid out under the Provisi-
onal Constitutional Order (PCO) promulgated by Musharraf. It would 
implicitly endorse all the constitutionally illegal acts committed by 
the regime and, thus, would be contrary to the demands of civil so-
ciety groups demonstrating daily in Pakistan. Indeed, a boycott by 
major parties of the electoral process would theoretically have dele-
gitimized the entire arrangement.
Yet, the two major parties, the People’s Party of Benazir Bhutto and 
the Pakistan Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif, agreed to participate in 
the process and, thus, damaged the protest movement that had been 
counting on their support. Both leaders may have felt that, had they 
not participated in the elections, the already present corruption cases 
could be re-instituted against them. The military was aware of these 
weaknesses and also understood the traditional rivalry between the 
two leaders. By allowing Sharif back into the country, it created a fur-
ther challenge to Bhutto’s electoral ambitions. 
It was while she was campaigning for elections in Rawalpindi, the 
base for the army’s high command, that Bhutto was killed. Whether 
the killers were Islamists, as the government claims, remains to be 
seen. One thing, however, is certain: there is now widespread suspi-
cion regarding the government’s complicity in this event. Moreover, 
the assassination has also worsened ethnic tensions in a country that 
has never been free of such worries. Many in her home province of 
Sind felt that, once again, a Sindhi politician of national stature has 
been deprived of a share in the country’s power structures. For many 
of her supporters, Bhutto’s death was reminiscent of that of her father, 
the ex-Prime Minister Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, who was hung by another 
military dictator who was seen as representing Punjabi interests, as 
does the present regime.
Despite its obvious ethnic dimension, Benazir Bhutto’s assassina-
tion had the strange quality of being expected and yet, until it hap-
pened, quite unimaginable. It has, however, further exposed both the 
illegitimate nature of Musharaf ’s regime, and the fundamental disen-
chantment of the Pakistani people with the state. The failure of this 
state to provide a modicum of hope for social mobility and economic 
stability to the majority of its citizens, along with the vanishing sense 
of personal security in rural and urban areas, has shattered the aura of 
invincibility once held by Musharaf. The fracturing of the state is not 
only recognizable by the insurgency in Baluchistan or by the Islamist 
radicals in Sarhad and Swat, but also by the potential of some of these 
groups to set up civic and judicial services outside the formal state 
structures. The illiberal character of some of these systems notwith-
standing, there is no doubting their popular appeal when contrasted 
with the increasingly violent state.
In the final analysis it is not about personalities like Musharaf, rather 
it is the institutional entrenchment of the Pakistani military that is 
at stake. As a political entity the military has been the key conduit 
of US interests in Pakistan. Currently, there is a growing awareness, 
within the military and its US supporters, of the military’s current lack 
of credibility among the Pakistani people. Musharaf ’s decision to re-
nounce his uniform—to become a civilian president—may be under-
stood, therefore, as an attempt by the military to untangle itself from 
the everyday processes of governance, though it continues to control 
the levers of power in Pakistan. Worryingly, the Pakistani military has 
only given up power to leave the country in turmoil: in 1971, Paki-
stan was divided into two parts after a brutal civil war; and in 1988, 
after the sudden death of Zia-ul-Haq, it suffered 
the after effects of the Afghan war—namely, in-
creased Islamic militancy, ethnic strife, and the 
proliferation of drugs and arms. The social and 
political costs of the last eight years of military 
rule are manifest in the very violence that led up 
to the elections on 18 February.
The challenges faced by Pakistan’s democratic 
and civilian groups are now multi-fold. As the 
election results show, when given a chance, the 
Pakistani people chose to vote against the re-
gime’s supporters. The issue of national integrity, 
the reduction of violence, and the creation of a 
governing consensus among different provinces 
and ethnic groups may be foremost in the minds 
of the new parliament. Yet, in Pakistan, the mere 
restoration of democratic forms of governance 
is not enough. Rather, a much deeper sensitivity 
to the problems of poverty and economic dep-
rivation is needed for democratic interventions 
to be meaningful. Democratic struggle in the 
twenty first century should not only be against 
tyranny, but against misery and injustice for it to 
provide a future of hope.5 
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3. This Western audience is pivotal for a 
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proponent of human rights...” According 
to Musharaf, the only people who are not 
against him are the Western leaders which 
he describes as “absolutely supportive” and 
as expressing “total solidarity.” Jemima Khan, 
“An Extraordinary Encounter with Musharaf,” 
Independent, 2 February 2008.
4. His replacement, General Kiyani, has been 
thoroughly vetted and primed by the USA 
to continue the kind of access General 
Musharaf had promised.
5. See Arjun Appadurai, “Hope and Democracy,” 
Public Culture 19, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 29-34.
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